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UNIVERSITITEKNOLOGI MARA (UiTM) 
An Introduction 
Universiti Teknologi MARA (formerly known as MARA Institute of Technology) 
is Malaysia's largest institution of higher learning. It had its beginnings in 1956 as 
Dewan Latihan RID A, a training centre under the supervision of the Rural Industrial 
Development Authority (RIDA). 
Nine years later Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) Act, 1965 provided for a change 
of name from Dewan Latihan RIDA to Maktab MARA (MARA College). The Act 
also defined a new role for the MARA College - to train Bumiputras (literally it 
means "the sons of the soil" - ie the indigenous people) to be professionals and 
semi-professionals in order to enable them to become equal partners with other 
ethnic groups (ie the former migrants, especially the Chinese and Indians) in the 
commercial and industrial enterprises of the nation. 
In 1967 Maktab MARA was renamed Institut Teknologi MARA(ITM) (or MARA 
Institute of Technology). In August 1999, the Institute was upgraded to university 
status and named Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM). 
As pan of the government's affirmative action policies, UiTM provides education 
and training in a wide range of sciences, technology, business management and 
professional courses to 56,408 full-time students in 2000. Another 3,156 have 
enrolled for off-campus courses. In addition, there are 7,725 students in distance-
learning and flexible-learning programmes. 
The main campus stands on a 150-hectare piece of land on a picturesque hilly area 
of Shah Alam, the state capital of Selangor Darul Ehsan, about 24 kilometres from 
the city of Kuala Lumpur. 
The Universiti has also established branch campuses in the various states of the 
Federation: Sabah (1973), Sarawak(1973), Perlis (1974), Terengganu (1975), Johor 
(1984), Melaka (1984), Pahang (1985), Perak (1985), Kelantan (1985), Penang 
(1996), Kedah (1997) and Negeri Sembilan (1999). 
The Universiti currently offers 184 programmes conducted by 18 Faculties. These 
programmes range from post-graduate to pre-diploma or certificate levels. More 
than half of these are undergraduate and post-graduate programmes, while diploma 
programmes account for an additional 39%. Some of the post-graduate programmes 
are undertaken in the form of twinning programmes, through collaboration with 
universities based overseas. 
The following 18 Faculties currently run programmes in the University: 
Accountancy; Administration and Law; Applied Science; Architecture Planning & 
Surveying; Art & Design; Business & Management; Civil Engineering; Education; 
Electrical Engineering; Hotel & Tourism Management; Information Technology 
& Quantitative Science; Mass Communication; Mechanical Engineering; Office 
Management & Technology; Performing Arts; Science; Sport Science & Recreation. 
In addition to faculties there are 17 'academic centres' to cater various academic, 
business, technological and religious needs of the campus community. They are 
Extension Education Centre (PPL); Language Centre; Centre for Preparatory 
Education; Resource Centre for Teaching and Learning; Total Quality in UiTM 
(CTQE); Department of Academic Quality Assurance & Evaluation; Computer 
Aided Design Engineering Manufacturing (CADEM); Malaysian Centre for 
Transport Studies (MACTRANS); Text Preparation Bureau; Bureau of Research 
& Consultancy; Malaysian Entrepreneurship Development Centre (MEDEC); 
Islamic Education Centre; Centre for Integrated Islamic Services; Business & 
Technology Transfer Centre. 
THE FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATION AND LAW, UiTM 
The Faculty of Administration and Law (formerly known as the School of 
Administration and Law) was founded in 1968. It began as a centre offering British 
external programmes, the LLB (London - External) and the Chartered Institute of 
Secretaries (now Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators). The only 
internal programme offered then was the Diploma in Public Administration and 
Local Government (DPALG). In 1978 the LLB (London - External) programme 
was terminated and replaced by the current internal LLB programme. The LLB is 
a three-year academic degree course based on the structure of the undergraduate 
law programmes normally offered in the British universities. Unlike most of the 
British LLB programmes, however, the LLB at the Faculty is conducted on a 
semester system. In 1982 the Faculty introduced a one-year LLB (Hons) programme 
towards which graduates of the LLB could advance their studies. The LLB (Hons) 
is a professional and practice-oriented programme that provides training to students 
for their career in the legal practice as Advocates and Solicitors. The delivery of 
the curriculum for this course adopts the method and strategy of simulated or 
experiential learning. Because of the unique experience it provides to students in 
their legal training this course has acquired wide recognition and acceptance among 
the Malaysian public. 
The Faculty of Administration and Law enjoys strong connections with the legal 
profession, particularly the Malaysian Bar, and the industry. It takes pride in 
continually developing pioneering options in its degree programmes, both at the 
academic and professional levels. In 1995 the Faculty introduced the degree of 
Bachelor in Corporate Administration (Hons) to train young and bright Malaysians 
to hold office as Company Secretaries. In the pipe-line are some new courses -
Bachelor of Law and Management (Hons), Bachelor of Administrative Science 
(Hons), Masters of Law and Executive Masters in Administrative Science. 
The Faculty currently comprises some 70 academic staff from both the disciplines 
of law and administration. It has about 600 students reading for the LLB and LLB 
(Hons) and 500 students reading for the Diploma in Public Administration and 
Bachelor in Corporate Administraiion (Hons). The Faculty admits about 200 
students each year. 
Main Entrance to Shah Alam Campus 
EDITORIAL NOTES 
This law journal had a long period of gestation in the Faculty. There were several 
attempts in the past, by individuals or the faculty collectively, to bring about its 
parturition. It is no easy task to initiate an academic journal, regardless of the 
discipline it represents. It demands a high degree of commitment in time, energy 
and attention. It calls for an intense love of labour for scholarship among a critical 
mass of the faculty members, either in the editorial board or as article contributors. 
But, at long last, this journal has arrived. 
Many factors led to this successful launch. The recent elevation of this institution 
to university status created its own impetus. Our strong law programme and its 
capable teachers demanded, and will benefit from, this specialist forum for aca-
demic debate and analysis. There is support within the legal profession and among 
our many distinguished alumni for such a journal, too. We are delighted by the 
synergy and collaborative goodwill the notion of a journal has evoked. So, we 
were able to marshal much expertise and experience to bring out this inaugural 
issue of the Journal. 
Academic faculty at UiTM are part of the worldwide network of academia. We 
must participate in discussions and debates over issues that are not only of direct 
academic and professional concern but also of importance to the general public. A 
journal such as this facilitates reflective and disciplined participation. In doing so, 
it helps the Faculty, and the University, to undertake its noble role in serving the 
general community. 
A learned journal is one of the major measures by which the weight and prestige of 
an institution are judged. It reflects the institution's maturity and ability to manage 
and conduct its specialist discipline. It reflects a confidence among its faculty to 
offer themselves to be evaluated in the open market place of ideas, and it serves 
notice of the faculty's readiness to serve the community at large. This Journal, in 
no small measure, marks the coming of age of the Faculty. 
The Journal functions also as a meeting point for law teachers and practitioners 
who share a common interest in various areas of law. It provides them a source of 
information on the current and topical issues in their specialised areas. It creates a 
forum for the exchange of ideas and for engaging in discourse over sometimes 
intricate and often vexed legal issues. Much is gained by the legal fraternity, as 
well as the legal system, through such engagements and encounters. 
Law teachers, as members of the broader academic community, are aware that it is 
no longer tenable for them to function solely within their traditional ivory towers, 
isolated from the reality of the world outside. For career and professional advance-
ment, and for taking their rightful role in the community, no academic can confine 
herself to her classroom or departmental audience. She must reach for a wider 
audience. The recognition (or lack of it) that she gains from her peers, both within 
and without the discipline, will speak for her standing and credibility in the com-
munity, both scholarly and otherwise. This Journal will serve as one channel for 
the Faculty members to reach that wider audience. 
There are relatively few academic legal journals in this country. Most existing 
legal publications cater for the professional needs of legal practitioners. One rami-
fication of this is that there are few discourses on theoretical and abstract legal 
issues. Yet these issues are important for the fuller appreciation and development 
of the law and the legal system, by the legislature, the reform bodies and the courts. 
This Journal will try to answer this need and stimulate discussions on issues that 
are of interest and relevance to the academic and broader communities. 
The labour and skill required for this Journal to thrive will challenge the staff of 
the institution and the supporters of this initiative among the profession and the 
wider community. We hope the Journal sails well in fair winds. 
Our wish is that Malaysia's legal profession, its legal academic circle and the many 
students and practitioners of law in this country and elsewhere will benefit from 
this forum for analysis and reform. We hope this Journal makes an important con-
tribution to debate on vital legal matters in our society. We hope, too, that our quest 
for self-expression and critical reflection among the members of the legal academia 
will be assisted by this Journal. It is with great pleasure and some satisfaction at 
the completion of this worthy task that we complete this inaugural Editorial. 
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ARTICLES 
THE PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE REGULATORY 
REGIME IN MALAYSIA 
by MOHAMMAD R1ZAL SALIM* 
Introduction 
The relationship between the issuer and subscribers of securities has traditionally 
been based on the law of contract whereby misrepresentation, whether innocent or 
fraudulent, will result in the contract being rendered voidable. In addition, the law 
imposes an obligation on the issuer of securities to disclose certain specified1 and 
relevant2 information. 
One may wonder why there is a need to disclose information for the issue of secu-
rities. Consider if the legislature enacts a law requiring car salesmen to disclose all 
information relating to the car to potential purchasers. Or any other merchandise, 
for that matter. What is the difference between cars and securities? 
Unlike cars which can be inspected and purchased on an "as is where is" basis, the 
value of securities depends very much upon the possible future income which 
such securities may be expected to generate, weighed against the risks associated 
with the issuer and its business. Securities are described as "intricate merchan-
dise" which potential purchasers cannot examine without help from the seller.3 In 
the absence of disclosure requirements, the risk of fraud was thought to be so 
enormous that government assistance was needed. Therefore, the legislature has 
intervened to require that issuers of securities disclose all information which may 
be material, relevant or desirable to enable investors to make an informed invest-
ment decision. This is evident in s 39(l)(d) of the Companies Act, which requires 
a prospectus4 to "state the matters specified in Part I of [the Fifth Schedule] and set 
out the reports specified in Part II of that Schedule". Through this provision, the 
legislature determines the nature and type of information to be provided in a pro-
* Lecturer, Faculty of Administration and Law, Universiti Teknologl MARA, Malaysia, LLM (Melbourne), 
LL.B (Horn) Malaya, Advocate and Solicitor. High Court of Malaya, 
1 Companies Act 1965 (Companies Act), s 37(1). 
2 Securities Commission, Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities (SC Guidelines), para 10.22(c). 
See also Securities Commission Act 1993, s32B which created offences for false or misleading stalements, or 
statements suffering from "material omission". 
3 H A J Ford and R P Austin, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (1992) at 388. 
4 As defined in the Companies Act, s 4(0, and funher explained in sub-s (6) of'the same section. 
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spectus. The Registrar of Companies (the Registrar) is the authority entrusted with 
approving and registering prospectuses,5 Any "untrue statement" or "wilful non-
disclosure" of information may be dealt with by the investor and the Registrar 
pursuant to ss 46 and 47 respectively, which provides for civil and criminal liabili-
ties for mis-statements and omissions in prospectus. 
Pursuant to the Securities Commission Act 1993 (SC Act), the legislature has in-
troduced a new provision6 which, when read with the rulings of the Securities 
Commission (SC),7 requires the issuer of prospectus to disclose all such informa-
tion which may be required by investors and his professional advisers to assess the 
merits and risks of acquiring such securities.6 This places the obligation on the 
issuers of securities themselves, and not on the legislature or other relevant au-
thorities, to determine the nature of information which may be required by inves-
tors.9 This requires the issuer to work with professional advisers, together sharing 
the responsibility of fulfilling the investors' informational needs. Heavier and higher 
standards of responsibility are required from the issuers, "any of its officers or 
associates",10 "a financial person or an expert"," or "any other person",12 to ensure 
"timely, sufficient and accurate disclosure of all material information".I3 
Is the "intricate" nature of securities the only reason for such disclosure require-
ment? Or were there some other objectives? The disclosure of information by issu-
ers of securities was required in other markets14 based on the perception that such 
disclosure is desirable for the good of the investors and of the nation. This article 
explores some of the accepted arguments for mandatory disclosure.'3 
Arguments for Mandatory Disclosure 
Increasing public confidence 
Corporations engaged in any sector of a country's economy form the backbone of 
the country's economy and wealth. These corporations require access to capital. 
5 CompaniesAct,s37(l). 
6 The SC Act, s 32B. 
7 The body empowered to regulate the issue of securities: SCAct, s 15(l)(b). 
8 SC, Due Diligence Practices, paras 9-12 and SC Guidelines, para 10.22(c). 
9 Although Ihe pre-vetting function by the Registrar is not dispensed with; see Companies Act, s 42. 
10 SCAct,s32B(])a. 
11 Ibid, para (b). 
12 Ibid, para (c). 
13 SCh Due Diligence Practices at para 11. 
14 Countries which provides for mandatory disclosure include the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, 
Hong Kong and Singapore. 
15 There are considerable theoretical debates on the matter, prominently by United States'writers. Arguments for 
mandatory disclosure were argued by, among others, Seligman, "The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corpo-
rate Disclosure System" (1983) 9 J Corp L t; Coffee, "Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System" (19S4)70 Virg LR 717. For arguments against disclosure, see Easterbrook and Hschel, 
"Mandatory Disclosure and (he Protection of Investors" (1984) 70 Virg LR 669; Sigter, "Public Regulation of 
Securities Markets" (1964) 37 J Bus 117; Benston, "The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Require-
ments" (1969) 44 Ace Rev 515. 
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The issue of securities is a relatively inexpensive way of raising capital. Investors, 
on the other hand, require a return on their investment. It is fundamental that in-
vestors have confidence in the value of the securities they will be acquiring and 
that the issuers will deliver on their promises. If the issuers are allowed to make a 
glowing but eventually empty and unfulfilled promises, investors' confidence will 
be affected, and they will withdraw their capital. If this happens on a large scale, 
the economy would suffer. Therefore, disclosure rules demands accountability by 
issuers, deters fraud and gives investors access to information. 
This view of disclosure to increase public confidence can be traced back to when 
mandatory disclosure requirements were introduced in the United States. It was 
asserted that, by requiring the seller to tell the whole truth, disclosure "should give 
impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public 
confidence".'6 
This view was echoed in Australia by the Campbell Committee,17 which agreed 
that the disclosure rules promote public confidence in the securities industry and, 
more particularly, in companies issuing securities to the public, thus ensuring that 
investors have all the information necessary to make an investment decision. 
Seligman18 agreed with the view that disclosure increases public confidence by 
reducing investors' fear of fraud. He said:19 
The assumption that investors will be more willing to purchase securities when 
compulsory disclosure of material information reduces the incidence of fraud, 
increases the reliability of estimates of firm value, or reduces the volatility of 
securities price swings is an articulation of the familiar financial theory of risk 
aversion. Other things being equal, investors assumedly will choose investments 
with the least risk. To persuade investors to select investments with greater risk, the 
investment sellers must offer a higher expected rate of return. In this sense, increasing 
investor confidence in the securities market may have several important economic 
consequences. By reducing the perceived risk of corporate securities, compulsoty 
disclosure will tend to reduce the risk premia that issuers selling new securities 
would have to pay, thus increasing the funds available for economic growth. 
Reduction of investors' concerns that securities fraud waves periodically may drive 
down securities price levels will tend to increase propensities to save. And reduction 
in the volatility of market price swings (caused by investor ignorance of material 
data) will tend to increase allocative efficiency. 
16 In a speech by (he President of the United States in the recommending passage of the United States/ Securities 
Bill, which was introduced as part of a New Deal programme following the great depression in Ihe 1930s. 
17 Campbell Committee, The Australian Financial System • Final Report of the Committee of Enquiry (1981) at 
para 21.124. 
IS Seligman, "The Historical Need for a Mandatory Coiporate Disclosure System" (198S)9 J CrapL 1. 
19 Ibid at 252. 
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Unequal possession of information among investors 
Information obtained by investors is likely to differ depending upon their ability to 
obtain corporate information and their skill in analysing the information received. 
A rationale for mandatory disclosure is to prevent better informed traders from 
reaping unfair profits from trading on their superior information. Mandatory dis-
closure helps ensure that all investors have equal access to information. Investors 
will make an investment decision based on the information that they receive, know-
ing that the information is accurate and contains all the information that they need 
to make an informed decision. This will also help prevent speculative trading and 
insider dealing. 
Reduction of waste 
Disclosure will help prevent, or at least reduce, the incidence of insider dealing, 
conflicts of interest and waste.20 For example, if there is a disclosure requirement 
for executives' and directors' compensation, it is less likely that executives and 
directors will over compensate themselves, at the corporations and therefore the 
investors' expense. 
Reducing costs 
Mandatory disclosure reduces the costs incurred by investors. Duplication of search 
and verification costs incurred by investors in pursuing trading gains do not create 
additional wealth; one party's gain comes at the other party's loss, whereas the 
process of researching and verifying information consumes real resources.21 These 
costs are reduced by mandatory disclosure.22 
The inadequacy of anti-fraud laws 
The remedies provided by common law to compensate defrauded investors are 
inadequate,25 In some cases, by the time an investor discovers that he has been 
20 Ibid ai 251. 
21 Coffee, "Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System" (1984) 70 VirgLR 717 
at 733. 
22 On the other hand it was argued that a drawback of requiring disclosure in prospectuses is the costs associated 
with the issue of the prospectus. The costs are related to the processes required to enable the issuers and related 
persons to rely on the statutory defence of due diligence ihraugh certification and verification, tt includes the 
costs of underwriters, lawyers, accountants, market researchers, etc. The costs associated with disclosure 
requirements of prospectuses occur at three levels. The first and most significant level is at the level of the 
corporation. The second is when the prospectus is prepared and lodged with the Securities Commission for 
registration. The third level occurs at the investors level: seeAzzi, "Disclosure in Prospectuses" (1991) CSLJ 
205 at 212, quoting Easterbrook and Fischel, "Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors" (1984) 
70 Vir LR 669. 
23 The rights of persons who suffered loss as a result of mis-statements and omissions in prospectus are governed 
by the law of tort for deceit or negligent misrepresentation: see Derry v Peek (1889)14 App Cas 337 and 
Hedtey Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Lid [1964] AC 465, For a discussion on these cases, see LC 
Keong, Securities Regulation in Malaysia (1997) at 110-117; Woon, Company Law (1997) at 431. 
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defrauded, the corporation from which he purchased the securities will have be-
come insolvent. Further, the expense of litigation is enough to deter a small inves-
tor from bringing an action against the corporation. Often he has no choice but to 
suffer the loss and sell the securities at a much lower price. It is also difficult to 
prove fraudulent misrepresentation, as the investor would not have access to con-
fidential information of the corporation. Even if investors can ultimately protect 
themselves through litigation, many will find that the expense or the risk of litiga-
tion a sufficiently unpleasant experience that they would quit the securities 
market,2" 
The Requirement for a Prospectus 
In Malaysia, disclosure of certain information is mandated by law. The Companies 
Act requires companies to submit certain information to the Registrar of Compa-
nies, and it is available for inspection by the public. Similarly, the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange requires companies whose shares are listed with them to disclose 
certain information. These are discussed in standard company law textbooks and 
are outside the scope of this discussion. What is an issue for discussion here is 
disclosure of information in prospectuses. 
When is a prospectus required? 
The Companies Act prohibits a person from issuing circulars or distributing any 
form of application "for shares in or debentures of a corporation unless the form is 
issued circulated or distributed together with a prospectus, a copy of which has 
been registered by the Registrar",25 A prospectus is defined ins 4(1) of the Com-
panies Act as "any prospectus ... notice circular advertisement or invitation invit-
ing applications or offers from the public to subscribe for or purchase or offering 
to the public for subscription or purchase or offering to the public for subscription 
or purchase any shares in or debentures of or any units of shares in or debentures 
of a corporation or proposed corporation." 
The concept of "offer to the public" 
The meaning of the term "offering shares or debentures to the public" is explained 
in s 4(6) of the Companies Act, which provides that "offering shares to the public 
shall... be construed as including a reference to offering them to any section of the 
public, whether selected as clients of the person issuing the prospectus or in any 
other manner..." 
24 On the other hand it was argued that anti-fraud statutes are sufficient to preserve investors confidence. There 
is no evidence that there is lesser incidence of fraud with disclosure rules than with anti-fraud legislation 
alone: see Easterbrook and Fisehel, supra n 15 at 638-639. 
25 Companies Act s37(l). 
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The most problematic of these terms is "offer to the public". Section 4(6) provides 
an inclusive and therefore not a comprehensive definition of what constitutes an 
"offer to the public". The High Court of Australia26 had said that such an inclusive 
definition is "commonly both to extend the ordinary meaning of the particular 
word or phrase to include matters which otherwise would not be encompassed by 
it to avoid possible uncertainty by expressly providing for the inclusion of particu-
lar borderline cases." 
There are numerous cases on the subject,27 which is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. It is sufficient to say that these cases illustrate the difficulties of determining 
whether an offer or invitation can be said to be an offer or invitation to the public. 
Such uncertainty is not appreciated, especially in the securities market.2* 
Bonus and rights issues 
Bonus issues and non-renounceable rights issues are exempted from prospectus 
requirements, as s 4(6){c) of the Companies Act provides for an exemption in 
respect of an offer to existing members or debenture holders of a corporation. For 
26 Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union (1985) 10 ACLR 59 at p 61-62, in 
relation to the provisions of the Australian Companies Code (Ihe predecessor of the current Corporations 
Law), whose relevant provision is in pari materia with the Companies Act. 
27 See, eg. Nicholas v. Can Realty Sdn Bkd 11970] 2 MLJ 89; PPv Huang Sheng Chang [1983] 2 ML) xcvi; 
Maltima Singh v Baldev Singh [1975] I MLJ, 173; Attorney General v Derrick Chong Soon Choy [1985] 1 
MU97; Khania Nominees Ply Ltd v. Hamilton (19S6) 10ACLC737; O'Brien v Melbank Corporation Ltd 
(1991)7ACSR \9\Lee v Evans 11965) I ALR 614. For a discussion on the topic, see LC Keong, Securities 
Regulation in Malaysia [l971)it&S-92;V/oon, Company Law (I997)at4l\ -416. 
28 It is noteworthy that the Australian Corporations Law has departed from the "offer to the public" concept for 
the issue of prospectuses. The Corporations Law now requires that a prospectus be lodged and registered for 
all offers and invitations to subscribe for or buy securities, unless exempted; see ss 1018 and 1017. The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Bill 1988 indicated (he reason for the abandonment of the 
"offer to the public" concept was that the interpretation of the term caused confusion as to whether a prospec-
his was requited in a particular circumstance. See Com panics and Securities Ad visory Committee, Prewpram 
law Reform Sub-Committee Report (1992) at para 158. The Committee stated (at para 159} that, as a matter of 
practice, it was always difficult to determine whether or not an offer was an offer to the public or sect ion of the 
public. This uncertainty invited exploitation and many fundraising schemes sought to benefit from the loop-
hole created by the expression "offer to the public". For the situation in Singapore, see the Companies Act of 
Singapote, ss 106B - 106J and Woon, Company Law (1997) at 434-436. In the United States, the Securities 
Act 1933 exempts from the Securities Act registration statement requirements any offers and sales of securi-
ties made "in transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering"; & 4(2). popularly known as the 
"Section 4(2) Exemption" or "private placements". The underlying principle is that the exemption should be 
made available only in those cases in which (he offerees (and purchasers) of (he securities do not require 
protection of the Securities Act registration. The important factors are: 
(a) The number of the offerees (or purchasers) must be limited, but if the securities are of high quality and 
the offerees (and purchasers) are large, financially sophisticated institutional investors, a significant 
number may be permissible. 
(b) Information generally comparable to that which would have been provided by a Securities Act registra-
tion statement and which is material to investors must be known by or provided to the offerees (and 
purchasers). 
(c) The offerees (and purchasers) must be capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the investment, 
(d) There must be understandings or obligations in place reasonably designed to prevent resales of the secu-
rities by the offerees (and purchasers) to the public. This is an anti-avoidance provision: see Gregory K 
Palm and Donald C Walkovik, United States -A Special Report IFLRev Special Supplement, July 1990. 
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a renounceable rights issue, an abridged prospectus will be required, containing 
the particulars set out in the Fifth Schedule of the Act,29 
Options 
In The Mutual Home Loan Funds of Australia Lid v Attorney General for New 
South Wales™ it was held that a simple offer of options over unissued shares is an 
offer of the underlying shares. Therefore a prospectus is required when the offer is 
made.31 
Continuous disclosure and the protection to investors in open market 
The issue here is whether investors in the secondary market are entitled to the 
protection afforded by the law in relation to the disclosure of information by the 
issuers. The definition of a prospectus in s 4(1) of the Companies Act, which in-
cludes an invitation or offer to the public "to subscribe for or purchase shares or 
debentures", may indicate that it does. On the other hand, the word "purchase" 
may only apply to the purchase of shares or debentures in relation to s 43(1) of the 
Act, which provides: 
Where a corporation allots or agrees to allot to any person any shares in or debentures 
of the corporation with a view to all or any of them being offered for sale to the 
public, any document by which the offer for sale to the public is made shall for all 
purposes be deemed to be a prospectus issued by the corporation ... 
Further, s 42A of the Companies Act provides for a supplemental prospectus only 
in cases where the prospectus has been registered but before its issue. The Act is 
silent on the need for a supplementary prospectus for information update after the 
issue of the prospectus. It is an indication, therefore, that the disclosure obligation 
applies only at the time of the issue of the prospectus. There is no obligation on the 
issuer to continuously disclose information which may be material to investors 
subsequent to the issue of the prospectus.32 Therefore, investors purchasing securi-
ties in the open market will not be protected by the disclosure requirements and, in 
any event, the prospectus may already be outdated soon after its issue. Therefore, 
to be able to make an informed investment decision, the investor will have to make 
enquiries with the stock exchange as to any recent change in the company's opera-
29 Companies Act, s 39A( 1) and (2). 
30 [1974] 1NSWLR 110. 
31 See Baxt, Ford & Black, Securities Industries Law {1993) at para 321. Bui note the controversy relating to the 
nature of options, whether as a continuing offeror conditional offer: Luybutt vAmocap (1974) 132CLR 57; 
NCSC v Consolidated Gold Mining Areas NL (1985) 1 NSWLR 454,9 ACLR 706,3 ACLC 424; Re Asia Oil 
£ Minerals. Ud (1986) 10 ACLR 333,4 ACLC 202. 
32 Compare with the position in Australia where the Corporations Law requires continuous and periodic disclo-
sure, also known as Ihe "enhanced disclosure regime": s 1022AA. However the purpose of this disclosure is 
noi to protect investors in the secondary market, but to reduce the content of prospectus disclosure for a 
disclosing entity which has complied with its disclosure obligations under the enhanced disclosure regime. 
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tions (if the company is listed) and any other disclosures required by law, eg an-
nual returns, accounts and auditing requirements. The problem with these disclo-
sures is that they do not attract the liability for mis-statements or omissions of 
material or relevant information imposed by law. Investors seeking to claim for 
civil remedies have no option but to rely upon the imperfections of remedies under 
the common law. 
Contents of a Prospectus 
The Companies Act contains a detailed and highly specific list of matters to be 
disclosed in a prospectus, which is stipulated in s 39 and schedule 5. In addition, s 
42 of the Companies Act precludes the Registrar from registering a prospectus if it 
contains any statement or matter which in the Registrar's opinion is misleading, or 
if it does not appear to comply with the requirements of the Companies Act. Al-
though there seems to be an affirmative duty on the part of the Registrar to peruse 
the draft prospectus, there is nothing which obliges the Registrar to vet the draft 
prospectus in detail to ensure it complies with the requirements of the Companies 
Act and to determine whether it contains anything misleading before registering 
the prospectus. Such an obligation would be time consuming and expensive, and 
would add to the expense of an issue. It also requires, on the Registrar's part, 
expertise and manpower to vet the draft prospectus and if necessary to communi-
cate with the proposed issuer or their advisers about additional information or 
materials, or verification of facts. At the very best, the Registrar may satisfy him-
self that the draft prospectus complies with the requirements of the Act by using a 
check-list approach, but there is no way the Registrar can be fully satisfied that the 
draft prospectus does not contain anything which is misleading. Nor would the 
Registrar be able to detect any omission or mis-statement. Further, there is a lack 
of accountability on the Registrar's part, as there is no statutory liability imposed 
on him if he registers a defective prospectus, even if it had conducted a thorough 
pre-vetting. 
Therefore, the acceptance by the Registrar and the registration by him of the pro-
spectus does not mean anything more than compliance with s 42. In addition, the 
mere failure to register a prospectus pursuant to this section does not make an 
allotment of shares subscribed for on the faith of the prospectus void or voidable at 
the option of the allottee.33 It would appear that the object of the registration re-
quirement is to have a copy of the prospectus permanently recorded before its 
issue and to give the Registrar some supervisory powers over its form and content. 
The question arises, is this pre-vetting function by the Registrar necessary? Scep-
tics may argue that it is not. It is time consuming, and adds to the cost of the issue 
of the securities. In addition, the greater the period of time between the preparation 
33 See Marshall v Commonwealth Homes and Investment Co Ltd (1941) SASR 74. 
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of a prospectus and the issue of the prospectus, the greater the risk of insider trad-
ing taking place based on information contained in that prospectus. 
The next question is, what should the prospectus reveal? The rationale of manda-
tory disclosure of information, as had been discussed above, is to increase public 
confidence, promote equal possession of information among investors, reduce waste 
and costs, and to overcome the inadequacies of anti-fraud laws. To achieve all 
these objectives, the prospectus should contain the information required by inves-
tors in order to come to an informed decision whether or not to acquire the securi-
ties. Therefore all relevant and material information must be disclosed. Unfortu-
nately, there are no such requirement, although the courts have ruled that state-
ments in a prospectus must be made with the "utmost candour and honesty".34 
Under the Companies Act, although there is no requirement that the issuer must 
disclose any other information other than the information prescribed under s 39 
and the fifth schedule, the Act imposes civil and criminal liabilities for untrue 
statement or wilful non-disclosure. Section 46(1) of the Companies Act provides 
for certain categories of persons3* to be liable to pay compensation to "all persons 
who subscribe for or purchase any shares or debentures on the faith of the prospec-
tus for any loss or damage sustained by reason of any untrue statement therein, or 
by reason of wilful non-disclosure therein of any matter of which he had knowl-
edge and which he knew to be material". Criminal liability is imposed under s 47 
of the Companies Act for the same offence, ie for an "untrue statement" or "wilful 
non-disclosure". 
The difficulties in the above provisions are numerous.36 First, the person seeking 
to impose the liabilities must prove that the statement was untrue and that the non-
disclosure was "wilful". Although there is no mens rea requirement for an untrue 
statement, s 46(3)(d)(i) provides for a defence if the defendant "had reasonable 
grounds to believe, and did up to the time of allotment or sale of the shares or 
debentures believe, that the statement was true". This allows the defendant to 
escape liability by saying that he relied on the information provided by his subor-
dinates or a third party without seeking to investigate or affirm its accuracy or 
truthfulness. Secondly, "wilful" refers to the doing of an act with intention, or 
knowledge, or with premeditation. Thirdly, the plaintiff suing under s 46 needs to 
show causation - the section requires him to show that he bought the securities "on 
the faith of a prospectus", and that the loss arose "by reason of any untrue state-
ment ... wilful n on -disclosure"." Fourthly, the range of defendants who may be 
34 Flavei v Giorgio (1990) 2 ACSR 568. 
35 Listed in paras (a) to (d). 
36 See discussion in LC Keong, Securities Regulation in Malaysia (1997) at 117-123. 
37 In MocleayvTait\ 1906) AC 24 the court ruled that the test lo be applied in determining whether a person has 
acted on the faith of the prospectus is to ask the question: "but for the statement in the prospectus would the 
outcome of the decision to invest be different?*' 
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sued are limited3* - the issuing company may not be sued; neither may experts and 
advisers unless they "authorized or caused the issue of the prospectus".39 
These deficiencies were perhaps the motivation behind the enactment of a new 
disclosure requirement regime pursuant to s 32B of the SC Act. This provision 
applies to any proposal submitted to the SC as required under s 32 of the SC Act. 
Pursuant to s 32(4) of the SC Act, read together with sub-s 2(a) of the same sec-
tion, no person shall "make available, offer for subscription or purchase, or issue 
an invitation to subscribe for or purchase securities in Malaysia" unless "the Com-
mission has approved the proposal under this section." By virtue of this provision, 
a prospectus must first be approved by the SC before its issue. 
Section 32B of the SC Act provides criminal sanctions in respect of false or mis-
leading statements and material omissions. The section reads: 
(1) Where any statement or information is required to be submitted to the Com-
mission under this Division in relation to or in connection with any proposal 
submitted pursuant to section 32 -
(a) an applicant, any of its officers or associates; 
(b) a financial adviser or an expert; or 
(c) any other person 
shall not 
(aa) submit or cause to be submitted any statement or information that is 
false or misleading; 
(bb) submit or cause to be submitted any statement or information from which 
there is a material omission; or 
(cc) engage in or aid or abet conduct that he knows to be misleading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive the Commission. 
Except for para (cc) which requires the mens rea of "knowledge" of the persons 
stated in paragraphs (a) to (c), paras (aa) and (bb) impose liability without the need 
to prove mens rea, However, the section goes further to provide a statutory 
defence by creating an obligation to persons stated in paras (a) to (c) to conduct 
enquiries to ascertain that the statement and information provided are true and that 
there is no material omission, Sub-s (2) reads: 
(2) It shall be a defence to a prosecution or any proceeding for a contravention of 
subsection (1) if it is proved that the defendant, after making enquiries as 
were reasonable in the circumstances, had reasonable grounds to believe, and 
did until the time of making of the statement or provision of the information 
or engaging in the conduct, was of the belief that -
38 Section46(lKaHd). 
39 Section46(lXd). 
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(a) the statement or information was true and not misleading; 
(b) the omission was not material; 
(c) there was no material omission; or 
(d) the conduct in question was not misleading or deceptive. 
The effect of the above provision is that the issuer of securities and his advisers 
may escape liability under s 32B, if they can prove that he had conducted reason-
able enquiries. The enquiries to be conducted refer to a "due diligence exercise". 
The SC said:40 
The provision of this statutory defence effectively creates an affirmative obligation 
by the relevant persons to exercise due diligence and to take steps in ensuring the 
timeliness, sufficiency and accuracy of the disclosure of all documents, statements 
and information which are to be submitted to the Securities Commission. 
The creation of a "disclosure based regulatory framework"41 adopting a "materiality" 
test for disclosure of information, together with the statutory defence, places the 
responsibility on the issuers of securities and its advisers to conduct a proper and 
thorough investigation or due diligence exercise, "to enable the investor and his 
professional advisers to evaluate the risks or merits of his investment in the 
issuer".ai In effect, the SC now adopts a general and non-prescriptive disclosure 
obligation, which places the onus on the issuers and its advisers to determine the 
information which is to be disclosed to investors.43 It should be noted that under 
this new disclosure framework based on the test of "materiality", a person may 
escape liability for non-disclosure, even if he knows that the information is impor-
tant to the recipient of the information, if a reasonable person would not regard the 
information as material.44 
Under the general disclosure obligation as prescribed by the SC, only relevant or 
material information needs to be disclosed. The focus of the prospectus is now on 
the needs of the investor, which the issuer, with the assistance of its advisers, must 
determine.45 The issuer and its advisers must therefore be sensitive to the changes 
in the market and investors* sentiments and react to these changes accordingly. 
40 SC, Due Diligence Practices, para 7. 
41 Ibid at para 9. 
42 Ibid at para 10. See also SC Guidelines, para I0.22(l)(c). 
43 This new disclosure framework appears to follow the legislation in Australia. There, the Corporations Law has 
also departed from the previous prescriptive disclosure requirement provided by its predecessor, the Compa-
nies Code (the relevant provisions ate similar to the Malaysian Companies Act). The Explanatory Memoran-
dum of the Corporations Bill 1988 states, at para 3033: 'These provisions were specific and whilst requiring 
extensive quantities of material to be disclosed did not necessarily ensure that the investors received adequate 
information about the securities in question.* The Memorandum further stated that the Companies Code "did 
not provide the information that private and professional investors need to make an informed investment 
decision/': para 3045. 
44 See Baxt, Ford & Black, Securities Industry Law (4(hed„ 1993) at para 423. 
45 SC had suggested the formation of a "due diligence working group comprising senior representatives of the 
issuer, promoters, advisers all persons who are responsible for the preparation of information and documents 
for submission which would report and advise the board of the issuer": SC, Due Diligence, pain 21, 
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Further, the issuer must supply information which wiU enable investors to evalu-
ate and review corporate performance and compliance with good corporate gov-
ernance practices through the supply of information. 
Curiously, the legislature has not abandoned the prescriptive requirements and the 
pre-vetting role of the Registrar together with the "reasonable test" adopted by ss 
46 and 47 of the Companies Act. Perhaps it is to make use of the best of the two 
different disclosure requirements. On the other hand, the dual disclosure regimes 
have certain disadvantages. First, it adds up to the cost and time for issuing securi-
ties. Secondly, there may be a case where investors or their professional advisers 
will not reasonably expect to find in a prospectus certain information, but the drafters 
of the prospectus will nevertheless have to include them to avoid liability under ss 
46 and 47 of the Companies Act. It is not an issue of whether these two different 
legislations can co-exist, rather of whether there is a need to have two different 
statutes with two different enforcement authorities and employing two different 
disclosure requirements and liability tests on the same subject-matter. 
Thirdly, the standard of disclosure of information pursuant to the SC Act is not 
enacted in the SC Act but rather provided by the SC in their booklet,4* which does 
not have statutory force. As a comparison, in Australia, the requirement that the 
prospectus must contain all such information as investors and their professional 
advisers would reasonably require is provided in the Corporations Law,47 
Finally, s 32B only imposes criminal liabilities and not civil liabilities. By con-
trast, s 1022 of the Australian Corporations Law imposes both civil and criminal 
liabilities. 
The Standard of Enquiries 
The SC had ruled that "The extent of due diligence required in any given situation 
is ... a question of fact which would depend upon the circumstances surrounding 
each particular case."4* As guidance, the SC had laid out some factors which should 
be taken into consideration, while awaiting determination by the courts.49 Never-
theless, the SC encourages market participants to develop a body of due diligence 
practices.50 
As the general and non-prescriptive disclosure requirement was adopted from 
markets such as Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore, professional advisers in 
46 SC, Due Diligence Practices. 
47 Corporations Law, s 1022. 
48 SC, Due Diligence Practices, para 16. 
49 Ibid at para IS. 
50 Ibidatpara21. 
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Malaysia had been quick to adopt the due diligence practices in these markets.51 
This is the personal experience of the author, who was involved in due diligence 
exercises for the verification and certification of information contained in pro-
spectus. However, we will have to wait and see whether the courts will approve 
this method of verification and certification, or set a different standard of due dili-
gence for the local market. 
The standard of enquiries and due diligence came under scrutiny in a leading United 
States* court decision. In Escon v BarChris Construction Corporation,52 BarChris 
offered US$3.5m subordinate convertible debentures to satisfy their working capital 
requirements. It was disclosed in the prospectus that the company was in the busi-
ness of constructing bowling alleys. BarChris later defaulted on its debentures and 
petitioned for bankruptcy. Upon a class action taken against the defendants, (which 
includes the issuer, all eight underwriters of the issue, the signatory to the registra-
tion statement (including all of BarChris' directors, the independent public ac-
countant and certain officers of BarChris), the court found that the prospectus was 
false and misleading as: 
(a) it was not disclosed that some of the proceeds were to be used to repay BarChrisi 
debts; 
(b) BarChris was also in the business of operating bowling alleys (and not merely 
constructing them as stated in the prospectus); and 
(c) certain financial information was overstated. 
The court then evaluated the conduct of the defendants in detail to determine whether 
they may rely on their due diligence defence. 
In respect of the underwriters and its lawyers, it was found that the underwriters 
did not make an independent investigation of the accuracy of the prospectus. The 
underwriters' lawyers assigned a very junior associate to read the documents relat-
ing to some of BarChris* subsidiaries for the five previous years. Some of the 
executive committee minutes of meetings were missing. When the lawyers asked 
about the missing minutes he was told that they had not been written up, were "not 
significant", or dealt with "routine matters". The court therefore, found that the 
underwriters had failed in their duty and could not rely on the due diligence de-
fence, as they had neglected to make some reasonable attempt to verify the data 
submitted to them. Their investigation was also not adequate, as they had failed to 
read all the minutes and review all the significant contracts. The lawyers should 
5) Perhaps taking the "suggestion" of the SC: see SC, DM Diligence Practices M para 23 where the SC men-
tioned the "suggested manner adopted in some jurisdictions1*, 
52 283F,Supp643pn68XU.S.D.C.). 
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have insisted that the missing minutes be written up so that they could be reviewed. 
They also failed to investigate a certain legal dispute involving the company. 
As for the directors and officers, the court found that four out of five executive 
directors were aware of some of the inaccuracies in the prospectus and thus could 
not rely on the due diligence defence. As for the outside directors, the court looked 
at their relationship with the company. Two of the outside directors had profes-
sional relationships with the company, one being a partner of the company's law 
firm and the other a partner in the underwriter. Both were involved in the prepara-
tion of the registration statement. Therefore the court held that both could not rely 
on the due diligence defence as they have not exercised reasonable care. With 
respect to the other two outside directors, the court applied the test of "a prudent 
man... in the management of his own property". These directors made no investi-
gation at all. Both had been directors for less than one month before the offering 
was made. One director had spent about 10 minutes looking through a draft of the 
registration statement. The other director never saw it. When amendments to the 
registration statement were required, both signed the amendments without the reg-
istration statements attached. Therefore the court found that these two directors 
had not conducted reasonable investigations, and could not therefore rely on the 
due diligence defence. 
This case sets an example on the standard of investigation required by the issuer, 
directors and underwriters. First, there must be an independent investigation con-
ducted on the information provided in the prospectus. Secondly, what may be con-
sidered a "reasonable" investigation varies, depending on their state of knowl-
edge. The standard required of a managing director must therefore be a much higher 
one than one would expect from an outside director. Even the relationship between 
the outside director and the company may be a relevant factor in determining 
whether such outside director may be entitled to rely on the statutory defence. 
It shall be interesting to see whether these principles will be adopted to set the 
standard enquiries and due diligence locally. The author submits that the judgment 
meets the standard of care expected by market participants; and is perhaps also 
consistent with the expectation of the legislature and SC." 
Who Should Be Protected by the Prospectus Requirements? 
The United States' Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) require that pro-
spectuses be completely informative both to the unsophisticated investor and to 
53 See SC, Due Diligence Practices, at para 11 where the SC said thai the disclosure based regulatory framework 
imposes a "Heavier and higher standards of responsibilities and accountability ... on the issuers and their 
directors, promoters, advisers, and other persons involved in a proposal to provide the investor and his profes-
sional advisers with timely, sufficient and accurante disclosure of all material information". 
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the knowledgeable student of finance.54 This requires the drafter of a prospectus to 
take into account basic information required by ordinary investors and large insti-
tutional investors. The Wheat Report suggested that a pragmatic approach needs 
to be struck between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. 
The SEC's view has been criticised, for it requires the drafting of the prospectus to 
be "all things to all men".55 Kripke suggests that the theory that prospectuses can 
be used by lay investors is a myth.56 He argues that modern accounting rules which 
form the basis of prospectuses have become so complex that it takes a person 
trained in modern financial accounting to begin to understand these accounts." 
Therefore disclosure should be directed to sophisticated investors who is able to 
understand it. 
On the other hand, it may also be argued that sophisticated investors do not need 
the protection afforded by the disclosure requirements as they have enough re-
sources to determine the merits and risks associated with any particular securities. 
Therefore the prospectus should be directed to the less sophisticated investors. 
SC allows some flexibility to issuers and its* advisers to take into account certain 
considerations, by providing that:58 
In determining what information is required, regard shall be had to-
(a) the types and characteristics of the securities and issuer of the securities; and 
(b) the types and characteristics of the persons likely to be the potential investors. 
The above provision may be useful in the case of specialty securities such as 
those which will be listed in MESDAQ. As start up companies without a track 
record of profitability and high risk venture may be allowed to list their securi-
ties in this exchange, the risk taken by the investors is greater. But so are the 
returns, if the venture proves to be successful. Therefore, these securities will 
perhaps appeal only to certain sophisticated or professional investors, who may 
require different types of information from that which may be required by other 
types of investors, 
Apart from the flexibility in allowing consideration to be taken on the type of 
securities, the issuers and the potential investors, there should be an exemption for 
issues to institutional investors and other big issues, as found in the legislation in 
54 United Slates* Securities and Exchange Committee, Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Federal Admin-
istrative Policies Under the '33 and '34 Acts (1969) ("Wheat Report"). 
55 Marsh, "New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Securities Offerings - A Panel Discussion" (1973) 28 
Bus Law 505 at 527. 
56 H Kripke. "The Myth of the Informed Layman" (1973) 28 Bus Law 631. 
57 H Kripke, "The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities" 45 NYULRev 1151 al (169. 
58 SC Guidelines, para 10.22. 
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Singapore and Australia.59 Acknowledging the differences in concept between the 
regime in Malaysia and those of Singapore and Australia,60 it will do no harm if 
issuers are given assurance that such issues will not be considered "offers to the 
public". Further, a public offer which requires a substantial amount of minimum 
subscription may also warrant an exemption. 
There should also be a case for allowing the issuer to take into consideration the 
fact that certain matters are public knowledge. There may also be cases where 
certain information, while it cannot be said to be "public knowledge", is generally 
known to sophisticated investors and professional advisers.61 Further, certain 
information may be required by the stock exchange, registrar of companies, SC or 
other regulatory body. Providing this information in prospectuses will be an 
unnecessary burden, as it will not achieve the desired effect to contribute to the 
existing wealth of information in the market. This information should, however, 
be deemed to be prospectus information, to enable investors and the authorities to 
rely on the SC's disclosure requirement as well as ss 46 and 47 of the Companies 
Act.62 
Conclusion 
Mandatory disclosure of information is an indispensable rule in the securities market, 
The arguments for mandating disclosure are overwhelming, despite the voices of 
dissent and the concerns that the costs of issuing securities which may be prohibitive 
to small issuers with relatively small issues.*3 Malaysia has willingly embraced 
this regime of disclosure. The question asked here was not whether or not the 
philosophy behind the mandatory disclosure regime is appropriate for our market 
(not to say that this issue is not relevant), but rather we have adequately addressed 
the ever changing corporate landscape and investors' expectations. 
59 See the Companies Act of Singapore, s I06D and the Australians Coiporations Law, s66(3)(a) which provides 
an exclusion in relation to sophisticated investors, as described in these provisions. This exemption is indicative 
of the view of the legislature that large institutional shareholders are able to take care of themselves and do not 
need protection afforded by the prospectus. But see the comments by RPAustin, "The Fundraising Provisions 
of the Proposed Corporations Legislation" (1989) No 7 Butterwonhs Company Law Bulletin 77 at 92; and 
John Azzi, "Disclosure in Prospectus" (1991) 9 CSLJ 205 at 219. 
60 Where ihe "offer to the public concept" has been abandoned. See discussion above under the sub-topic "The 
concept of 'offer to the public". 
61 See Golding and Bancroft, "Secondary Sale of Prospectuses: What Do 1 Disclose When I Know Nothing?" 
[1993] BCBC, para 427. 
62 See Ian Ramsay, "Incorporation by Reference into Prospectuses: What are the Rationales?" (1994) 12 CSU 
310. 
63 For example, Easterbrook and Fischel argued that the general disclosure requirements possess much of the 
characteristics of interest group legislation, which give larger issuers an edge as many of the costs of disclo-
sure are the same regardless of the size of the issuer or the offering: see Easterbrook and Rschel, "Mandatory 
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors" (1984) 70 VirLR 669 at 671. 
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